Background The paper investigates the use of healthcare tax credits (HTCs) in Italy through the analysis of a panel data, which provides information on individual income tax from 2008 to
Introduction
In several western countries, taxpayers are given the option to subtract a share of their out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure from gross tax liability. This opportunity stems from an equity principle, which is ensuring healthcare access to everyone regardless of personal resource availability [1] [2] [3] . The use of healthcare tax credits (HTCs) aims at decreasing the cost of health access for people who are in need of care. However, results in terms of equity may vary according to both the kind of health care system and the type of credit scheme configured for each country. Within market-oriented Health Care Systems, where access to health services requires either a direct payment or the presence of a health insurance, HTCs provide financial help to low-income people. To this extent, evidence from the USA Health Care System suggests that if HTCs are targeted to specific categories of taxpayers (for example lowincome people), they address equitable results because they widen healthcare coverage to otherwise uninsured people [4] . On the contrary, if these credits are extended to the whole population they tend to favor people with higher income [5, 6] .
With reference to countries providing universal healthcare coverage, results are more controversial: the choice of consuming private, rather than free public services, is strictly related to individual income. National Health Care Systems encompassing both private and public providers generally present longer waiting times for access to public services: a patient will presumably choose the private access instead of getting a free service if he needs a faster admission. Evidence suggests that only patients with middle-to-high income or a very urgent demand for health services (e.g. oncology patients) will choose to pay out of pocket (OOP) in the presence of both public and private supply [1, 7, 8] . To this extent, HTCs can be viewed as a tool that is mostly regressive, because it is predominately used by people with higher disposable income [5, 9] .
Focusing on the Italian case, the literature shows that HTCs tend to favor the richest sector of the population [10, 11] . The Italian NHS is a Beveridge oriented System where access to care is free of charge or subject to a copayment, but patients can also choose to consume private services and pay the full cost. HTCs are claimed for both kinds of OOP payments, i.e. private services consumption and copayment, but do not apply for the premiums paid for private healthcare insurance. Since the share of copayment represents only 9% of the whole OOP expenditure [12] , HTCs are mainly claimed for the consumption of private services.
Looking at the distribution of HTCs among the Italian regions, a North-South gradient is apparent. Per capita HTCs, either weighted for general population or for the number of claimants, are higher in the North than in the South of Italy and the same unequal distribution can be observed for per capita values of OOP (see Figs. 2, 3, 4) . 1 These disparities may be explained by differences in the income distribution among macro regions which drive to an unequal use of private services and, consequently, produce heterogeneous values of per capita OOP among Italian regional clusters. Focusing on the use of HTCs, their configuration tends to favor taxpayers in the upper socioeconomic classes: in fact, tax credits are partly lost by taxpayers in the bottom income class, due to their low level of taxable income and to the non-refundable nature of these tax credits; furthermore, the lack of an upper bound is beneficial to taxpayers in the top income class [11, 13] . These reasons suggest that the determinants of per capita HTCs among regions relate mainly to socioeconomic factors.
Other socioeconomic variables than income may play a role in explaining the disparities in the use of HTCs between Northern and Southern regions. Among them, education can capture the familiarity with fiscal rules or the ability of using fiscal tools: claiming HTCs is not an easy task, because these credits are acknowledged only if the claimer provides the Revenue Agency with the receipt attesting the service's payment; for people with little awareness of this fiscal tool it could be troublesome to collect and store all the receipts, sum up the total amount of expenditure and correctly fill in the tax return form [14] . The North-South gradient in terms of HTCs may therefore be due not only to a higher per capita income and OOP expenditure by the Northern population, but also to a more efficient use of this tool. This paper investigates the impact of selected socioeconomic variables on regional per capita HTCs, with a specific focus on the role of education. The effect of education has, thus far, not been investigated in the extant literature and this paper tries to fill this gap.
The Italian NHS: A Brief Overview
The Italian NHS was founded in 1978, on the basis of the UK Beveridgian NHS. Its main characteristics are free access to care, universality of coverage, public financing, patient's free choice, separation between the provision and the financing of healthcare services, competition between providers of care and decentralization. Several of these features were reached through different reforms that took place over time with the two-fold objective of preserving equity of access and controlling the public healthcare expenditure, while maintaining the quality of services.
According to a chronological criterion, the first decade after the implementation of the Italian NHS, which replaced a pre-existing Social Security System, is prominently dedicated towards extending the universality of coverage through the whole territory and among different social classes. In the 1990s, due to a problem of high healthcare expenditure, managerialism and competition were introduced into the healthcare sector. Public hospitals were reformed and transformed into public firms and quasi market principles were promoted, favoring competition among public providers and between public and private providers [15, 16] . To accomplish these changes, new tools were introduced into the system: Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), which were implemented as a method of perspective payment for hospital admissions, gave more transparency and efficiency to hospital activity, while a copayment was applied to several health services in order to control for moral hazard behaviors.
Starting from the 2000, a new process of devolution and regionalization has characterized the Italian NHS, which now comprises 20 regional healthcare systems. Regions are responsible for the financing and organization of their healthcare systems, although the central government still plays a main role in warranting equity principles and governing the healthcare expenditure. Patients can move from one region to another to obtain healthcare services and the region where they live should pay the price of the healthcare access to the region where the service has been provided. The patients' migration phenomenon, which follows a South-North direction and moves a consistent flow of patients each year, reveals regional disparities in the supply of services and in the ability to satisfy the internal needs of care by each regional system [17] .
With reference to the most recent years, the increase of public health expenditure has finally been governed. This is due both to a rigorous observance of regional budget constraints, which became more stringent after the economic crisis, and to a rigid monitoring of the expenses for those regions showing prolonged deficits. As a consequence, an increase in the private expenditure has been observed. From 2010 to 2014 the OOP per capita expenditure has risen by 8%, from €512 to €553, while the per capita public expenditure experienced a nominal decrease of almost 2%, from €1861 to €1819 [12] .
Tax Credits in Italy: Theoretical Foundation and Practical Aspects
The tax credits system in Italy is rather heterogeneous in terms of services included and degree of expenses' coverage. Healthcare costs, together with house mortgages, insurance premiums, private education expenses and many others, can be partially detracted from gross tax liability in the measure of 19%. Figure 1 shows the different kinds of expenses for which tax payers have claimed a credit: in 2014 the healthcare expenditures amounted to €15,972 million and represented 59% of the whole expenditures benefiting from tax credits (TCs). The total amount of HTCs in 2014 was €2620 million, 2 which corresponds to 0.34% of the gross tax liability [18] .
According to the welfare theory, TCs are implemented to reduce the fiscal load of individuals that consume either merit goods (such as health or education) or goods whose improvement would generate positive externalities (such as green energy commodities). The State acknowledges an individual's right (access to health or education) or encourages a choice that increases the community welfare [19] [20] [21] .
The economic principle supporting healthcare TCs aims at decreasing the cost of health access for people who are in need of care. Their theoretical rationale is based on the concept of horizontal equity: since healthcare expenses are necessary and mostly uncertain, a shock in the individual health status could provoke a decrease in both patient's personal income and his fiscal liability [22] . In countries where healthcare access is regulated by the market, HTCs provide a financial help to patients who have to fund their own healthcare (through a health insurance or OOP payments). Evidence from the USA Health Care System suggests that if HTCs are targeted to specific categories of taxpayers (for example low income people) they address equitable results because they widen healthcare coverage to otherwise uninsured people [4] . On the contrary, if these credits are extended to the whole population, they tend to favor people with higher income [5, 6] and turn out to be regressive [23] .
With reference to countries providing universal healthcare coverage, literature is scant and shows controversial results. Smart and Stabile [14] in a paper referred to the Canadian Health System, raise concerns on HTCs' regressive effects. For the Italian case, a clear insight of the implementation and use of HTCs in Italy is provided by Dirindin [22] , who argues that this fiscal tool is mainly used by high income people to lower the cost of private service access. In other words, HTCs represent public money mostly used to subsidize the private providers of care; all these characteristics suggest that HTCs, beside encompassing distort incentives, were not able to reach equity purposes. Analyzing this issue further, it is possible to find two other purposes related to the decision of adopting HTCs in Italy. The first is linked to the need of reducing the widespread phenomenon of fiscal evasion by private providers of care (especially doctors): the patient's option of reducing his own fiscal burden by obtaining and keeping the receipt for service was considered a possible incentive to avoid collusive behaviors between patients and providers of care. However, too many variables impact on this process (among them the existence of a range of ''net prices'' from which both parts can still benefit from collusive actions) and this fact limited the achievement of this specific objective. The second advocated aim to justify the use of HTCs in Italy relates to the need for rationing the provision of public healthcare services in order to control for public expenditure. A temporary shortage of public services (i.e. congestion problems causing long waiting lists) can be provisionally filled in by recourse to private services; limited to these cases, the existence of a fiscal tool that decrease the patients' OOP expenditure is considered beneficial to both taxpayers and the whole system 3 [22] . All in all, the brief presentation provided for the use of HTCs in Italy raises concerns on their effect on income distribution. Recent empirical contributions corroborate these findings: Di Novi et al [11] suggest that HTCs tend to favor the richest sector of the population and the same conclusions are addressed by Barbetta et al [10] . The present work provides further evidence on the possible unequal effects due to the use of HTCs within the public Health Care Systems.
The Use of Healthcare Tax Credits in Italy:
Some Descriptive Features
In Italy, access to care is free, except for a copayment applied to many goods and services, but patients can also choose the private supply of services and pay the full cost. OOP expenditure gives patients the right to a tax credit equivalent to 19% of the amount spent over €129. 11 [24] . The tax credits are claimed for OOP costs incurred by the taxpayer himself and his dependent family members, while expenses for private insurance premiums are not covered by this fiscal grant. Since copayment represents only 9% of the whole OOP health expenditure, this means that the public money reimbursed to individuals in order to alleviate the economic burden of healthcare access is ultimately and mostly used to remunerate the private supply of care. During the fiscal year, each taxpayer should keep all the receipts (pharmaceuticals, medical examinations, diagnostic tests, and others) in order to certify his OOP payment for healthcare services. Due to its specific configuration, the use of this fiscal tool is rather heterogeneous among Italian taxpayers. Table 1 shows, for the year 2014, the distribution by ventiles of income of both the number of claimants and the average value of OOP. With reference to the first variable, the share of claimants over the whole taxpayer population (column 5 and 6, Table 1 ) is 41.5% nationwide but its distribution is very concentrated among high income taxpayers: in fact, its cumulative value is 2% within the V ventile (up to an income of €7541) due to a very low tax liability, and it is still limited to 11% within the X ventile (with an income top level of €16,428), while the higher share (more than 30%) is concentrated between the XI and XX ventile of income distribution. The share of claimants over taxpayers increases at the rise of income clusters (respectively, 2, 9, 13 and 17%), suggesting that HTCs are claimed predominantly by taxpayers in the top income bracket. The same considerations apply with reference to the average value of OOP declared by taxpayers (last column, Table 1 ). Up to the V ventile, the average OOP expenditure is less than €600, but this value rises at €1155 for taxpayers situated between the XVI and XX ventile of income distribution, with an income ranging from €25,400 to €50,137.
Healthcare Tax Credits Distribution Between Regions: The North-South Gradient
According to the framework depicted above, and given a heterogeneous distribution of income among Italian regions, evidence shows both higher values of average HTCs and higher number of claimants over taxpayers for Northern rather than Southern regions. Figure 2 reports, for the years 2008 to 2014, the HTCs per capita values referred to the North, Centre and South of Italy, respectively. 4 Per capita values are represented by the ratio between the annual volume of HTCs and population residing in each geographical area (North, Centre, South). Over the time span considered, it is possible to observe higher (on average 2.4 times greater) values for Northern regions compared to Southern regions, while the values reported for Central regions lie between the two.
Looking at a parameter more sensitive to the ability of using HTCs at territorial level, namely HTCs weighted by the number of claimants, the North-South gradient is still [18] present, although reduced in magnitude due to the relatively higher number of people claiming HTCs in the North and Centre of Italy with respect to the South of Italy 5 (see Fig. 3 ). Central and Northern regions show almost the same values, whilst the yearly values for people residing in the South of Italy are on average 37% smaller. Individuals living in the North of Italy averagely retain on gross taxation €50 more for OOP expenditure compared to people residing in Southern regions.
For a deeper inspection of the trend of these variables at the regional level, please look at the Appendix, Tables A1  and A2 .
The trend of OOP expenditure, weighted for the local population, was also examined. Data on OOP were drawn from the database ''Health for All'' and a variable representing the ratio between total OOP and the population of each regional cluster was created. Figure 4 shows the 2008-2014 trend: although this variable is rather simplistic, because it is not weighed for population age, the gap between Northern and Southern population is apparent, confirming that, on average, the former spends €200 more on private healthcare access per resident than the latter. This difference, although fluctuating, is confirmed over the whole time-span. Given the strict correlation between OOP expenditure and disposable income [8] , it can be reasonably acknowledged that patients residing in the North or Centre of Italy, who, on average, have more disposable income, spend more on private healthcare access and make greater use of HTCs.
Methods

Datasets and Variables
The model explains the per capita value of HTCs (i.e. the regional total amount of HTCs weighted by regional population) by regressors related to three groups of variables: 5 The share of claimants over the taxpayers represents a measure of the ability of claiming HTCs among taxpayers. As explained in the previous section, it is correlated to income and for this reason follows a North-South gradient. In the time-span observed, the share is 46% in the North of Italy, 43% in the Centre and only 34% in the South of Italy.
specifically, (1) variables addressing the socioeconomic status of regional population, (2) variables controlling for the regional supply of health care services, and (3) a group of selected demographic and health-related variables chosen as proxies for a higher demand of healthcare services. Three data sources were used, the Ministry of Economics and Finance website, the ''Health for All'' (HFA) database and a source from the Ministry of Health, which provides data on copayment. Further details on these datasets are given below.
Data are provided on a regional basis and span over 7 years, from 2008 to 2014, for each of the 20 Italian regions, such that the panel includes 140 observations. As a preliminary approach, a number of fiscal and economic variables, which may explain the HTCs, were examined in order to test for possible model specifications. The source of fiscal data is represented by the Ministry of Economics and Finance website, which provides detailed information on IRPEF, the personal tax applied to different kinds of income (employment and self-employment, real estate, capital gains, corporate income and other incomes). Exemption area is determined by yearly incomes below €8000 for the employed, €4800 for the self-employed, €7500 for pensioners aged \75 years and €7750 for pensioners aged[75 years. This suggests that HTCs are partly lost by taxpayers in the bottom income class, due to their low level of taxable income and to the non-refundable nature of these tax credits.
Data drawn from the Ministry of Economics and Finance website includes the total yearly amount of OOP expenses for which taxpayers have claimed a credit (at regional basis), the regional number of taxpayers, the total amount of taxable income and the regional number of claimants HTCs. For each of the mentioned variables it was possible to further disaggregate the data into categories of tax payers (pensioners and employed). This option was subsequently used in a robustness check, when a separate model on pensioners, whose fiscal behavior is easily controlled for, was run [25] 6 . The natural logarithm of the financial values was created for a possible log specification. The dependent variable is represented by the regional per capita number of HTCs. Each year, the Ministry of Economic and Finance website provides the total amount of OOP expenses for which taxpayers have claimed a tax credit (labeled OOP_exp). The first step to calculate the dependent variable consists of detracting from this amount the initial deductible of €129.11 multiplied by the number of claimants (N_cl). The net result is then multiplied by 0.19, which is the applied percentage, and finally weighted by the regional population (pop), such that:
Data on healthcare access, healthcare expenditure, socioeconomic status and demography are derived from the HFA database, a comprehensive dataset covering 53 countries in the WHO European Region. Data for Italy are provided on a regional level. In order to control for supplier-induced demand phenomena within regions, two variables were selected: the percentage of public expenditure over the whole healthcare expenditure, and the total number of community care services (daily clinical services, mental health services, elderly and disabled services). The former can be considered a proxy of the use of public, rather than private, access and it is henceforth expected to impact negatively on regional per capita HTCs. Instead, a higher number of community-care services are expected to raise the value of HTCs due to a possible increase of prescription for both public and private services. Furthermore, this variable encompasses nursing homes for the elderly that generally require a nonnegligible copayment cost. Unfortunately, the last two variables are provided only for years 2008 to 2013, and consequently the number of observations for the chosen specification is reduced to 120 (see Table 2 ).
With regard to the socioeconomic status of regional populations, the variables initially selected from HFA are the following: the regional rate of unemployment, the percentage of households living in poverty, the share of population with no education or at most the primary school degree, the share of population with at most the lower secondary school degree (up to age 14). While the two former variables relate to possible variations in the healthcare access due to lower socioeconomic status 7 [3, 8, 26] [12] specifically selected in order to examine the effect of a lower education on the capacity of claiming HTCs. Demographic and health condition variables that were chosen as proxies for a higher demand of healthcare services are the elderly (65?) share of population [27] and the regional number of residency permits, to control for interregional variations due to regular immigrants' healthcare access [28, 29] .
The monetary variables were all weighted for population to obtain per capita values, which could be compared among regions. The variables employed in the final specification and their description are reported in Table 2 .
Empirical Strategy
Italy has a regional setting and maintains interregional differences over time. With reference to the healthcare sector, after the implementation of federalism, which started in 2000 with Ministerial Decree 56/2000, there are 20 autonomously administered regional Healthcare Systems [16] . Cultural and socioeconomic factors contribute to the identification of regional borders: some aspects, such as the attitude towards the public services or the familiarity with the fiscal rules, pertain to the regional background [30, 31] and do not vary across time. In order to account for regional time invariant variables that could be correlated to the regressors, the fixed effects Ordinary Least Square (OLS) specification was chosen. The equation is the following:
where the constant term a i captures the effects of those variables that change across regions but are invariant through time, the dependent variable y it is represented by the number of per-capita HTCs for each region i during the 6-year time-span; x it represents each independent variable i at the time t, and b is the coefficient to be estimated for each selected variable, e it is the error term [32] . Both the Hausman and the Mundlak tests confirmed the appropriateness of the fixed-effects model versus the random-effect model. 8 Different model specifications, including log-specification, were tested employing the Akaike information Criterion (AIC), to find the best-fitting regression model. The variables unemployment and poverty, initially chosen to address the socioeconomic status, had to be dropped because they were highly correlated with per capita income.
The final specification is the following:
Results
Full results are reported in Table 3 . The variables of interest are those addressing income and education. Per capita income, as expected, is highly significant, despite the value of its coefficient being very small (0.0064). However, this means that, among regions, after controlling for education and other factors explaining the demand for healthcare services, the higher the per-capita income, the The variables addressing education are weighted by population aged C 15 8 Output available from the author.
higher the size of per-capita HTCs. People residing in regions that over years experienced a rise in per-capita income, claimed more HTCs. This result corroborates both national and international literature findings and raises policy concerns on the equitable aims related to HTCs. The variable prim, which represents the percentage of people with only a primary school degree, has been chosen in order to capture another aspect related to the use of HTCs, which is the ability of claiming HTCs (i.e. store the receipts during the fiscal year and sum up all the healthcare costs when fulfilling the tax return), or the familiarity with fiscal rules. Evidence exists from international literature on the difficulties of claiming HTCs by people with low education [14] , but this issue has not yet been developed by national literature. The share of people having at most the primary education is both highly significant and negative. This coefficient is significant through different model specifications previously run (including log specifications), and demonstrates that education has an impact on the use of HTCs. This result is rather significant for policy objectives, because it suggests that, after controlling for per-capita income, the higher the share of people with very low education within one region, the lower the per-capita HTCs. Being less educated could be associated to a lower ability of understanding the fiscal rules and to less care in keeping and storing the receipts necessary to claim HTCs, or to an attitude of acceptance toward doctors' tax evasion behaviors. This evidence is corroborated by the fact that another educational regressor, sec, which is the percentage of people having the lower secondary school degree, is not significant. It suggests that only people with very low or no education are significantly less likely to use this tool.
With reference to the other covariates, the variables addressing the supply of healthcare services are both highly significant; as might be expected, the percentage of public health expenditure is negative. Instead, the number of community services within each region is positive, albeit very low in its coefficient, and may suggest the presence of supplier-induced demand.
The coefficient related to the share of elderly over the population is highly significant and actually remarkable. A 1% increase in this quantity over years, would drive to a 0.99-unit increase in the per-capita HTCs. Ageing is a determinant of access to healthcare services, but this result suggests that the elderly specifically make a higher use of the private access. Two other reasons may explain this result. First, since the majority of the elderly are retired and receive a pension, tax evasion phenomena are less likely to occur among them [25] ; second, the elderly might be more attentive in keeping and storing the receipts indispensable to HTCs. However, this is just an intuition that should be empirically investigated. The variable indicating the presence of immigrants is highly significant, albeit nearly null (coeff. = 0.0000145).
Robustness Check
Further evidence of the impact of education on the ability to claim HTCs is given by the robustness check: a new model was built where the dependent variable of the general model, namely htc_pc, was substituted by the share of claimants over the whole taxpayers (perc_cl). The latter is highly correlated to the regional per-capita value of HTCs, but is better fitted to represent a measure of the ability of claiming HTCs among taxpayers, because it picks up the exact number of taxpayers who decided to claim credits. Regressors and specification (OLS fixed effects) remained unchanged. 9 The equation is the following: Table 4 shows the results. With reference to the variables of interest, prim is highly significant and negative, while the variable addressing regional income is not significant. The share of claimants highly depends on the level of education within each region. All the intraregion variations experienced over years by the share of 9 The Hausman test suggested to refuse random-effects specification in favor of a fixed effects-model. claimants is picked up by the variable addressing low education; this evidence suggests that this variable is a good proxy of the scarce familiarity with fiscal rules. Both the familiarity with fiscal rules and the consequent ability of claiming HTCs impact on the dependent variable. It is possible that the group with a poor standard of education are not even aware of the opportunity to subtract part of the healthcare expenses from their tax liability. It is also possible that people with a very low education are less likely to face doctors' tax evasion behavior. Given the importance of education, it is interesting to observe the trend of the variable addressing a very low education within regions: Figure A3 in the Appendix provides the regional details. It can be observed that the value of prim has decreased constantly within each region in the time-span considered, but differences among regions are still relevant.
Discussion
The use of HTCs is highly debated by national and international literature due to its controversial effects on income distribution.
With reference to the Italian case, empirical evidence suggests that HTCs tend to favor the richest sector of the population [10, 11] . The present analysis corroborates these findings and adds a policy sensitive factor in explaining HTC distribution among regions. It demonstrates that, controlling for disposable income and other factors explaining the regional demand for healthcare services, the level of education plays a role in addressing regional differences of per-capita HTCs. Results confirm that regions that experienced a decrease in the share of people with very low education or no education at all, also experienced an increase in the per-capita value of HTCs. People living in regions showing the same per-capita income, but with a higher proportion of individuals with low education, claim fewer HTCs. A possible explanation, which is also addressed by international literature, is that people with lower education are less used to fiscal rules and probably less diligent in keeping all the receipts and using them when fulfilling the income taxation schedule [14] . Different educational attainments could also imply a different attitude towards doctors' tax evasion phenomena, with lower educated people more likely to accept collusive agreements with the providers of care. Whatever the cause, concerns arise on the consequences. Public money is reimbursed to regions where people are, on average, richer and better educated. The use of HTCs, whose rationale is that of alleviating the fiscal burden for people who need healthcare access, turns out to be mostly regressive and accentuates the Italian North South divide [34, 35] .
For all these reasons, Italian scholars and policymakers have recently discussed and debated the usefulness of this fiscal tool. Among them, many suggest replacing HTCs with better targeted expenditure programs [23, 36] . HTCs address both distortions and inequalities: they provide an incentive to purchase private services within a National Healthcare System, which should warrant every citizen the possibility of benefiting homogeneous levels of care. To this extent they represent a hidden, publicly funded subsidy to the private providers. Looking at their effect on income distribution, any policy that reduces taxable income within a progressive tax system will benefit most those in the highest marginal tax bracket, whilst totally excluding those who are out of the tax system [13] . Empirical evidence, either national and international, ascertained this point.
The amount of HTCs in 2014 was €2.62 billion, and represents 2.3% of the public health expenditure. Since this public money is reimbursed mainly to finance the purchase of private healthcare services by the richest part of the population, it would be worth thinking of other measures to favor healthcare access by people in need of care. For example, higher investments in the public sector with the aim of reducing waiting lists-especially in areas where the demand for services is inelastic (e.g. diagnostic areas)-would avoid negative health effects among people in low socioeconomic classes. An alternative measure, able to guarantee patient-free choice among public and private services, could be represented by a monetary bonus for low-income people, to be spent either for private access or for public services copayment. There is a final issue emerging from the study, which relates to population ageing. At the regional level, a 1% increase in the share of the population aged [65 years, results in almost €1 per-capita HTC increase. The magnitude of this coefficient raises concerns on the ability of the NHS to cope with the augmented need due to population ageing. Since in almost all the regions, people over 65 are not subject to copayment, results show that the elderly make large use of private services and this evidence suggests that some kind of integrative insurances for individuals getting older should soon be considered and implemented.
Before concluding, a note on the possible limitations concerning the analysis is advisable: two shortcomings can be addressed, both related to data availability. First, the use of aggregate data at the regional level does not allow to pick up infra-regional variability and consequently reduces the explanatory power of the variables. Second, the absence of data on the number and distribution of private providers for each region prevents the observation of interregional differences in the use of HTCs due to supplier-induced demand phenomena. Although the latter aspect has been controlled for by using other variables, this information would have certainly been useful in addressing the results.
Data Availability Statement Two data-sets publicly accessible have been used during this study. The first is available at the Italian Ministry of Economic and Finance repository, http://www1.finanze. gov.it/finanze2/pagina_dichiarazioni/dichiarazioni.php. The second data source is provided from ''Health For All'', available at the link: http://data.euro.who.int/hfadb/.
